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Locked Up and Counted Out:  
Bringing an End to Prison-based Gerrymandering 
John C. Drake  
INTRODUCTION 
At America‘s founding, representatives of slave-holding and free 
states debated how and whether to count slaves in allocating each 
state‘s representation in Congress.1 Their compromise became the 
much-maligned three-fifths clause to Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution.
2
 This clause mandated that the government count three-
fifths of the enslaved population in determining each state‘s 
legislative apportionment. Many people continue to believe that this 
apparent degradation of slaves as fractional human beings was the 
ultimate insult to black Americans.
3
 The Constitution counted 
enslaved Africans as only three-fifths of a person. The real injustice, 
however, is that the founders counted slaves at all for purposes of 
legislative apportionment.
4
 Historian Donald L. Robinson wrote that 
 
 
 
J.D. Candidate (2012), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2002), Baylor 
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 1. See DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
179–81 (1971). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 205. 
 3. See, e.g., Brooke E. Newborn, Correcting the Common Misreading of the “Three-
Fifths” Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Clarifying the “Hostile Fraction,” 80 PA. B. ASS‘N Q. 
93, 93 (2009) (describing the frequent refrain following President Barack Obama‘s election that 
the nation had advanced from a time when a black man counted as ―three-fifths‖ of a person to 
a time when a black man could be elected president). 
 4. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 89 (2005) (―The 
precise Article I question concerned Congress‘s proportions, not the slaves‘. The principled 
antislavery answer to this question in 1787 was that for legislative apportionment purposes, 
slaves should be valued not at five-fifths, or even three-fifths, but rather zero-fifths.‖). 
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the three-fifths clause ―established the principle, new in republican 
theory, that a man who lived among slaves had a greater share in the 
election of representatives than the man who did not.‖5 The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution nullified the three-fifths 
clause in 1868,
6
 but many rural regions in the United States continue 
to leverage a captive, disenfranchised population for political power.
7
  
Relying on the U.S. Census Bureau‘s usual-residence rule, which 
counts prisoners as residents of their prison communities, nearly all 
states credit prison towns with their prison populations in drawing 
lines for federal, state, and local political districts.
8
 The process by 
which communities increase their political clout on the backs of their 
prison populations has come to be known as prison-based 
gerrymandering.
9
  
This Note discusses the Census Bureau‘s application of the usual-
residence rule to prisoners, explains how states use this data in 
redistricting, and describes recently enacted laws in three states that 
represent an effort to change the process. This Note further links 
prison-based gerrymandering to the legacy of the three-fifths clause 
and provides a constitutional and common-sense rationale for all 
states to begin counting prisoners as residents of their 
preincarceration addresses, if they count prisoners at all. 
I. HISTORY  
A. The Usual-Residence Rule 
The process of legislative redistricting is historically tied to the 
decennial census. The Constitution requires that every ten years the 
U.S. Census Bureau count all people residing in the United States 
 
 5. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 201. Constitutional law scholar Akhil Reed Amar further 
described the cynical motive behind counting people who could not participate in American 
democracy for representational purposes: ―the more slaves a given state‘s master class bred or 
bought, the more seats the state could claim in Congress, for every decade in perpetuity.‖ 
AMAR, supra note 4, at 88. 
 6. See infra note 54. 
 7. See infra notes 61–65, 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 86–89, 107–24 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol37/iss1/11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2011]  Locked Up and Counted Out 239 
 
 
every ten years.
10
 The government conducts the count for the express 
purpose of determining the number of representatives that each state 
will have in Congress.
11
 Because people are transient and often spend 
substantial amounts of time away from ―home,‖ the early census 
counters established the usual-residence rule in order to determine the 
state in which mobile residents should be counted.
12
 The rule, put into 
place for the first census in 1790, requires that a person be counted as 
a resident of the place where he lives and sleeps most of the time.
13
 
The Census Bureau has applied the usual-residence rule to prison 
inmates since at least 1850 when it first counted prisoners as 
members of a ―prison household‖ in which the jailor was the head.14 
Only in the 1900 census did the Census Bureau instruct counters to 
note in the margin of a special census form the ―permanent place of 
residence‖ of prisoners.15 In 1910, the Census Bureau reverted back 
to ignoring prisoners‘ preincarceration addresses and counted 
prisoners as residents of their prison addresses in each decennial 
census since.
16
 
Today, a series of Census Bureau guidelines applies the usual 
residence rule to transient populations, those living away from home, 
 
 10. Article I of the Constitution states: 
The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members . . . apportioned among 
the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . . The actual 
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress 
of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner 
as they shall by Law direct. . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 804 (1992) (―‗Usual residence‘ was the 
gloss given [to] the constitutional phrase ‗in each State‘ by the first enumeration Act and has 
been used by the Census Bureau ever since to allocate persons to their home States.‖). 
 13. Residence Rule and Residence Situations for the 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_rules.html (last visited Sept. 
23, 2011) [hereinafter Residence Rule]. The Census Bureau‘s guidelines do not further define 
the phrase ―most of the time‖ other than to indicate that it is not necessarily the same as one‘s 
―voting residence or legal residence.‖ Id. 
 14. PANEL ON RESIDENCE RULES IN THE DECENNIAL CENSUS, NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL 
OF THE NAT‘L ACADS., ONCE, ONLY ONCE, AND IN THE RIGHT PLACE 84–85 (Daniel L. Cork & 
Paul R. Voss eds., 2006). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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and others.
17
 The Census Bureau‘s categorizations show that, in some 
instances, the Bureau has been willing to consider the fact that even 
when a person spends most of his time away from his home, he 
maintains an allegiance to his home community and should be 
counted there.
18
 However, the Bureau has not done so in the context 
of incarcerated persons. Across-the-board, the Census counts people 
who are incarcerated on Census Day
19
 as residents of the facilities in 
which they are incarcerated, without regard to where they may have 
lived for most of the year.
20
 For example, while the Census Bureau 
counts children attending boarding schools below the college level as 
residents of the parental home, it counts juvenile offenders housed in 
juvenile detention centers on Census Day as residents of the facility.
21
 
The Census Bureau defends its practices. In 2003, the Census 
Advisory Committee on the African American Population
22
 
recommended that the Bureau count prisoners as residents of the 
communities where they lived before their incarceration.
23
 In 2005, 
 
 17. Residence Rule, supra note 13. For example, the Census Bureau counts college 
students as residents of their on- or off-campus housing, and it counts people who own multiple 
homes where they live most of the year. Id. 
 18. For example, the Census Bureau counts students in boarding schools below the 
college level, for example, as residents of the parental home. Residence Rule, supra note 13. 
 19. In 2010, Census Day was April 1, 2010. 13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (2006) (requiring that the 
government conduct a census in 1980 and every 10 years thereafter ―as of the first day of April 
of such year‖). 
 20. Residence Rule, supra note 13 (requiring that residents of federal detention centers, 
state and local jails, juvenile correctional facilities and other places of incarceration be counted 
as residents of the facilities in which they are incarcerated on Census Day). While the rules 
appear inflexible, the Bureau has directed that people incarcerated in short-term jails awaiting 
hearing should be counted at the residence that they usually occupied before being jailed. 
Robert M. Groves, So, How do You Handle Prisons?, DIRECTOR‘S BLOG, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Mar. 1, 2010, 8:35 AM), http://blogs.census.gov/directorsblog/2010/03/so-how-do-
you-handle-prisons.html. 
 21. Residence Rule, supra note 13. 
 22. The committee is one of five race and ethnic advisory committees made up of 
academics, community leaders, and others who advise the Census Bureau director on increasing 
participation by racial and ethnic minorities in the census and who offer recommendations to 
ensure that the census count accurately reflects those groups. Census Advisory Committees: 
African American Advisory Committee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/cac/ 
race_ethnic_advisory_committees/african_american_advisory_committee/ (last visited Sept. 23, 
2011).  
 23. Recommendations of the Census Advisory Committee on the African American 
Population Made as a Result of Meeting on October 1–3, 2003, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 26, 
2005), http://web.archive.org/web/20050513183534/http://www.census.gov/cac/www/Recomm 
endation(AA)Fall2003.html [hereinafter Recommendations of the Census Advisory Committee]. 
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Congress ordered the Census Bureau to look into the feasibility of 
counting prisoners at their ―permanent homes of record‖ rather than 
at their place of incarceration.
24
 The Census Bureau reported several 
impediments to counting prisoners as residents of any place other 
than their places of incarceration.
25
 The Bureau‘s arguments included 
concerns that such a count would be inaccurate because prison 
officials do not keep standardized addresses,
26
 that it would be costly 
to send census counters into prisons to interview inmates and to 
verify any self-reported data,
27
 that such a change would have policy 
implications for how other group quarters were counted,
28
 and that it 
would violate the Census Bureau‘s duties under the Constitution.29 
B. One Person, One Vote 
While the federal government determines the apportionment of 
Congressional seats among states via the decennial census, it is up to 
 
The committee recommended counting prisoners at their preincarceration addresses ―for 
purposes of Congressional apportionment, state redistricting, the distribution of financial aid to 
their home communities, and to permit those communities to have more resources to meet their 
needs upon their return.‖ Id. 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 109-272, at 140 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). The directive came in the 
conference report on the appropriations bill covering the Census Bureau. Id. 
 25. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT: TABULATING PRISONERS AT 
THEIR ―PERMANENT HOME OF RECORD‖ ADDRESS (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
newsroom/releases/pdf/2006-02-21_tabulating_prisoners.pdf [hereinafter CENSUS BUREAU 
REPORT]. 
 26. In considering the feasibility of using preincarceration addresses, the Census Bureau 
reported that state and local correctional facilities generally did not keep ―detailed address 
information for all prisoners in correctional facilities‖ and that for federal facilities, 60 percent 
of the addresses in its prisoner database were not useable because they did not match an address 
in a master address file. Id. at 8–9.  
 
27.
 
The Census Bureau estimated that it would cost $250 million to ―interview all 
prisoners in all federal, state, and local correctional facilities and to process the address 
information reported by the prisoners,‖ which the Bureau indicated would constitute a ―1,200 
percent increase over the cost of enumerating prisoners in Census 2000.‖ CENSUS BUREAU 
REPORT, supra note 25, at 10. 
 28. The Census Bureau did not describe its concerns in this regard, other than to state that 
to count prisoners in a manner inconsistent with how other ―group quarters‖ populations were 
counted would have ―serious implications for the methods used to tabulate college students, 
nursing home residents, and other persons that reside in Group Quarters.‖ CENSUS BUREAU 
REPORT, supra note 25, at i. 
 29. ―It is unclear how the Census Bureau can satisfy its legal obligation to report the 
whole number of persons in each State for apportionment purposes if it tabulates prisoners at an 
address other than where they are confined.‖ CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, supra note 25, at ii. 
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the states to draw the boundaries of legislative districts through 
redistricting at least every ten years.
30
 In fact, the Constitution does 
not require states to use census data at all in redistricting.
31
 Until its 
landmark decision in Baker v. Carr,
32
 the Supreme Court stayed out 
of the ―political thicket‖ of legislative redistricting.33 With Baker, the 
Court affirmed the ―one person, one vote‖ principle as a 
constitutionally guaranteed right that would form the basis of a series 
of challenges to state legislative redistricting schemes over the next 
decade.
34
 The ―one person, one vote‖ principle represents the 
proposition that each person‘s vote is protected under the 
Constitution and that each citizen has a right to have his vote counted 
equally.
35
 ―The weight of a citizen‘s vote,‖ the Court has said, 
―cannot be made to depend on where he lives.‖36 In the legislative 
apportionment context, the Court has held that the Constitution 
requires states to make a ―good-faith effort‖ in order to ensure that 
legislative districts are ―as nearly as is practicable‖ equal in size.37 
 
 30. See 13 U.S.C. § 141(c) (2006) (requiring the Census Bureau to send to states within 
one year of Census Day population data for use in legislative redistricting); see also Chapman 
v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975) (―[R]eapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of 
the State through its legislature or other body . . . .‖). 
 31. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 330–32 (1973) (upholding District Court‘s 
rejection of Virginia‘s legislative redistricting plan that counted Navy personnel as residents of 
the senate district in which the ship was docked in reliance on census figures). 
 32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 33. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). ―The remedy for unfairness in 
districting is to secure State legislatures that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample 
powers of Congress.‖ Id. 
 34. In Baker, the Tennessee legislature failed to reapportion districts for some six decades 
despite substantial growth in urban communities. 369 U.S. at 192. This neglect led to the state 
having substantially more people in its urban districts than in its rural districts such that the vote 
of a rural voter was ―worth more‖ than the vote of an urban voter. Id. at 254–55 (Clark, J., 
concurring) (noting the ―wide disparity of voting strength between the large and small 
counties‖). 
 35. Baker dealt primarily with disposing of the political-question barrier to justiciability 
of legislative apportionment challenges. 369 U.S. at 196–98. The Court, however, would later 
clearly state the principle that the ―right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution 
of the weight of a citizen‘s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of 
the franchise.‖ Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 36. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567. The Court went on to assert the fundamental character of 
the one-person, one vote principle, ―[a] citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so 
because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of our 
Constitution‘s Equal Protection Clause.‖ Id. at 568. 
 37. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730, 738 (1983). 
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The principle applies with varying force to apportionments for state 
legislative purposes and Congressional purposes.
38
 The Court has 
allowed more deviation among state legislative districts than among 
Congressional districts.
39
 
With the Supreme Court establishing a constitutional requirement 
of parity among legislative districts, Congress stepped in with the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to prohibit states from using redistricting 
schemes to dilute the voting power of racial minorities.
40
 Pursuant to 
amendments to the Act in 1982, state legislatures must not apportion 
districts so as to dilute the strength of minority voters.
41
 
The political nature of the redistricting process, the inherently 
high stakes, and the infrequency of the opportunity have led to efforts 
by state legislatures to gerrymander districts—carve out districts 
intended to give some group, either political or demographic, an 
advantage.
42
 The Supreme Court has pointedly defined 
gerrymandering as the "deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district 
boundaries and populations for partisan or personal political 
purposes.‖43 In spite of this pejorative characterization, the Court has 
generally upheld the use of political considerations in redistricting, 
viewing political gerrymandering as inherent in the allocation of the 
apportionment duty to elected officials.
44
 Lawmakers are eager to use 
 
 38. Compare id. (finding a deviation of 0.7% in the sizes of congressional districts to be 
unconstitutional), with Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 329–30 (1973) (approving a 
deviation of 16.4% in the relative sizes of state House of Delegates districts in Virginia). 
 39. Karcher, 462 U.S at 732–33. The Supreme Court explained that the Constitution 
required greater parity in congressional districts: 
[W]e have required that absolute population equality be the paramount objective of 
apportionment only in the case of congressional districts, for which the command of 
Art. I, § 2 as regards the national legislature outweighs the local interests that a State 
may deem relevant in apportioning districts for representatives to state and local 
legislatures . . . .  
Id. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 41. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986). 
 42. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (9th ed. 2009). The word, gerrymander, was coined in 
1812 to describe a Massachusetts district designed to help the party of then Governor Elbridge 
Gerry. Id. Gerry‘s opponents said the district resembled a salamander. Id. 
 43. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 (1986) (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 
U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 
 44. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (―Politics and political 
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.‖). In upholding an Indiana 
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advantages gained in election cycles in order to cement their hold on 
power.
45
 While the Supreme Court has said political gerrymandering 
would be unconstitutional if the effect were ―continued frustration of 
the will of a majority of voters or effective denial of a minority of 
voters of a fair chance to influence the political process,‖46 in 
practice, one scholar called the Court‘s regulation of the practice 
―largely toothless.‖47 
In fact, racial gerrymandering is allowed, subject to exacting 
scrutiny by the courts, where necessary to comply with the federal 
Voting Rights Act or to otherwise ameliorate past dilution of 
minority voting rights.
48
 
 
redistricting plan drawn by Republican politicians against claims that it unfairly abridged the 
right of state Democrats to participate in the political process, the majority rejected the view of 
dissenting Justice Powell that ―at least in some cases—the intentional drawing of district 
boundaries for partisan ends and for no other reason violates the Equal Protection Clause in and 
of itself.‖ Davis, 478 U.S. at 138–39. The case involved a redistricting scheme in which the 
dominant party was upfront and candid about the political nature of its line-drawing as 
illustrated by the following excerpt from the deposition of the then Speaker of the Indiana 
House: 
MR. SUSSMAN: What I would like you to do here again is to give me whatever 
reasons were operative to your mind in maintaining or creating multi-member districts 
with regard to (Districts) 48 through 52 [the Marion County districts]. 
―MR. DAILEY: Political. 
―MR. SUSSMAN: What were the political factors? 
―MR. DAILEY: We wanted to save as many incumbent Republicans as possible. 
478 U.S. at 117 n.5. 
 45. After gaining control of the Texas Legislature for the first time in more than a century, 
Republican lawmakers famously set their sights on redrawing congressional districts so that 
their party would have a better chance at winning seats in Congress even though they came to 
power in a noncensus year. STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL 
REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY 19 (2007) (―The battle cry of 
some House Republicans in 2003 was that the Democrats had controlled the House of 
Representatives ‗since God made dirt,‘ or at least for the past ‗130 years,‘ and now that 
Republicans at last controlled the House, it was payback time.‖). The tactic worked. In 2002, 
Democrats had a 17–15 edge in Texas‘s House delegation. Id. at 264. In 2004, after the 
redistricting, Republicans held a 21–11 advantage. Id. 
 46. Davis, 478 U.S. at 133. 
 47. THOMAS E. MANN & BRUCE E. CAIN, PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, 
AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 78 (2005) (suggesting that the effect of the Court‘s test in 
Davis was to ―create a partisan gerrymandering cause of action in name only, because no one 
could find a plan that met [Davis‘s] high threshold‖). 
 48. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down a Georgia redistricting plan 
on the basis that race was the predominant factor in creating districts).  
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C. Unique Status of Imprisoned Citizens 
Most states do not allow imprisoned felons to vote.
49
 Only Maine 
and Vermont allow then-incarcerated felons to vote.
50
 Others only 
allow felons to vote once they are released,
51
 and other states 
disenfranchise felons for life.
52
 The Supreme Court has held that 
felon disenfranchisement laws are constitutional.
53
 In Richardson v. 
Ramirez, the Supreme Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment 
explicitly contemplates felon disenfranchisement.
54
 In light of the 
 
 
49.
 
One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1939, 1942 (2002) [hereinafter One Person, No Vote] (surveying state laws on felon 
disenfranchisement and concluding that ―[t]he nation seems to be nearing a consensus that the 
presently incarcerated should not have the right to vote‖). 
 
50.
 
Id. Vermont law requires prisoners to register to vote absentee in the town they lived 
in prior to incarceration. Opinions of Opinions, OPINIONS (Office of the Vermont Secretary of 
State, Montpelier, Vt.), May 2010, at 4, available at http://www.sec.state.vt.us/secdesk/ 
opinions/2010/May_2010_Opinions.pdf (noting that state law also forbids a prisoner from 
registering to vote in the prison town). In Maine, prisoners may register to vote in ―any 
municipality where that person has previously established a fixed and principal home to which 
the person intends to return.‖ ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 112(14) (2008). 
 51. One Person, No Vote, supra note 49 (noting that as of 2002, fifteen states and the 
District of Columbia allowed felons to vote after their release from prison). 
 52. Id. at 1943. 
 53. E.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (―[T]he exclusion of felons from 
the franchise has an affirmative sanction in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖). 
 54. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment‘s often-overlooked section 2 reads: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors 
for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). The effect of this provision is to diminish a 
state‘s representation in Congress when it disenfranchises any of its citizens, unless that 
disenfranchisement is based on criminal status. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 43. The Court‘s reading 
of section 2 as an affirmative sanction of felon disenfranchisement was challenged by Justice 
Marshall, who, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, suggested that the provision merely 
acknowledged the existence of felon disenfranchisement laws in many states. Id. at 75 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall further noted that the Court previously ruled that, 
while section 2 also acknowledges a voting age restriction of twenty-one, Congress had the 
power under the Equal Protection Clause to lower the voting age to eighteen. Id. at 74–75. He 
urged scrutiny of felon disenfranchisement laws under section 1‘s Equal Protection Clause, 
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presumptive validity of felon-disenfranchisement laws, courts have 
characterized these laws only during their periods of incarceration as 
constitutionally unassailable.
55
 
This disenfranchised population has another notable 
characteristic—namely that it includes a disproportionate number of 
racial minorities.
56
 The Justice Department reported that in the period 
from October 1, 2006, to September 30, 2007, the federal prison 
population nationwide was 38.7% black,
57
 a figure that was more 
than three times the representation of blacks in the U.S. population at 
the time.
58
 Also, the Justice Department reported that during the same 
 
which he said would lead to felon disenfranchisement laws being struck down. Id. at 77. 
Nevertheless, the right of states to disenfranchise felons appears to be settled law. See Robin 
Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R. 6th 31 (2006) (noting that courts have rejected 
claims that criminal disenfranchisement laws represent bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, 
and that the court have rejected challenges based on the First, Eighth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
Fourth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments, absent an intent by the state to discriminate on 
the basis of race). 
 55. A law disenfranchising then-incarcerated felons was recently upheld in Massachusetts, 
which allowed prisoners to vote until voters approved a referendum in 2001 disenfranchising 
them. Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 412 (2010). In 
Simmons, the First Circuit noted, in denying challenges under the Voting Rights Act and the 
Constitution‘s Ex Post Facto Clause, that ―[b]ecause the disqualification is confined to currently 
imprisoned felons, the state interests it serves are clearly at their strongest.‖ Id. at 33. 
 56. It is not the purpose of this Note to address the threshold question of whether racial 
characteristics should be considered when looking at the effects of gerrymandering. While the 
Voting Rights Act rests on the premise that diluting the voting power of racial minorities is 
morally repugnant, the argument that black voters share common interests is not without 
controversy. Compare Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (rejecting as ―impermissible 
racial stereotypes‖ the ―perception that members of the same racial group—regardless of their 
age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share the 
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls‖), with Christopher L. 
Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw v. 
Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 516, 523–24 (1996) (commenting on the ―unfortunate fact‖ that 
―interests in this society, where race still matters, will sometimes track racial lines‖ and arguing 
that, for example, ―interests will track racial lines to the extent that racial minorities have a 
special interest in fighting racial discrimination—just as farmers will have a special interest in 
certain issues of agricultural policies, such as price subsidies for crops‖). 
 57. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION, OCTOBER 1, 2006–SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 (2010), available at 
ht tp : / /bj s.ojp .usdoj .gov/content/pub/html/ fjsst /2007/tab les/ fjs07st710 .pdf  
[hereinafter CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION]. 
 58. In 2007, the Census Bureau estimated that blacks made up 12.7% of the U.S. 
population. United States: ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates: 2007, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=01000US&-qr_name 
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2006–2007 period, the federal prison population was 31.4% 
Hispanic/Latino,
59
 a figure that was about two times the 
representation of Hispanics in the U.S. population at the time.
60
 A 
2008 report of state prison populations showed a similar racial 
disparity, with black prisoners making up 38.2% of the population of 
state prisons at the end of 2006.
61
 
Another dynamic of this disenfranchised population is that 
prisoners are disproportionately urban while the prisons that the 
Census Bureau call their ―homes‖ are often in rural areas.62 As one 
commentator noted, in Pennsylvania, the ―state banishes many of its 
urban offenders to prisons in rural areas . . . .‖63 Texas also 
exemplifies this dynamic. Twenty-one percent of state prisoners in 
Texas come from Harris County (home to Houston), but only 2.1 
percent of state prisoners are housed in Harris County jails.
64
 Fifteen 
percent of state prisoners are from Dallas County, 7.7% from Tarrant 
County (Fort Worth), and 6.1% from Bexar County (San Antonio); 
however, no state prisoners are housed in any of those counties.
65
 
Five rural Texas counties combined—Walker, Anderson, Brazoria, 
Coryell, and Bee—play host to 36.6% of the state prison population 
 
=ACS_2007_1YR_G00_DP5&-ds_name=&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-format= (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates]. 
 59. CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION, supra note 57. 
 60. The Census Bureau reported that, in 2007, Hispanics made up 15.1% of the U.S. 
population. ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, supra note 58. 
 61. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2008, 37 
(2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf (reporting that of the 
1,331,100 sentenced prisoners estimated to be in state prisons at the end of 2006, 508,700 were 
black). 
 62. Anecdotal evidence about where prisoners who hail from urban areas are locked up 
tells the tale. In Illinois, for example, 60 percent of its prisoners are from Cook County, while 
99 percent of its prisons are outside Cook County. Rose Heyer & Peter Wagner, Too Big to 
Ignore: How Counting People in Prisons Distorted Census 2000, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS 
(Apr. 2004), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/toobig/toobig.html#ftnref3. Thirty-four 
percent of California‘s prisoners are from Los Angeles County, but only 3 percent of the state‘s 
prisoners are jailed there. Id. Philadelphia accounts for 40 percent of Pennsylvania‘s prison 
population, but not one of the state‘s prisons is located there. Id. 
 63. Marie Gottschalk, Op-Ed., No Prison Like Home: For the U.S. Census, Convicts are 
Counted as “Residents” of Towns and Counties Outside the Walls, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 
15, 2007, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/07227/809461-109.stm. 
 64. Eric Lotke & Peter Wagner, Prisoners of the Census: Electoral and Financial 
Consequences of Counting Prisoners Where They Go, Not Where They Come From, 24 PACE L. 
REV. 587, 593 (2004). 
 65. Id. at 592. 
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while less than 1.5% of the state prison population actually comes 
from those counties.
66
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, states built hundreds of new prisons, 
mostly in rural areas of the country.
67
 With these prisons came an 
influx of prisoners into rural areas, driving up populations in rural 
counties.
68
 Concurrent with the construction of new prisons, the total 
prison population rose dramatically by more than 500 percent 
between 1970 and 2000 to the point that there are about 2.1 million 
people in U.S. jails and prisons today.
69
  
The Census Bureau counts incarcerated people as residents of the 
districts in which they are incarcerated, but states often view them 
differently. The laws in many states require that officials count 
prisoners as residents of their preincarceration homes for state 
administrative purposes.
70
 Texas law, for example, indicates that ―a 
person who is an inmate in a penal institution or who is an 
involuntary inmate in a hospital or eleemosynary [charitable] 
institution does not, while an inmate, acquire residence at the place 
where the institution is located.‖71 Kansas law has a similar provision 
indicating that ―the residence of persons living in . . . correctional 
institutions shall be the place such persons resided before entering the 
 
 
66.
 
Id. 
 67. Tracy Huling, Building a Prison Economy in Rural America, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 197 (Marc Mauer & 
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). Economic development officials promised rural counties that 
new prisons would bring jobs and other economic incentives, benefits that Huling writes often 
fail to materialize. Id. 
 68. E.g., Rolf Pendall, Upstate New York’s Population Plateau: The Third-Slowest 
Growing “State,” BROOKINGS (Aug. 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2003/08demogra 
phics_pendall.aspx?p=1. In upstate New York, for example, nearly 30 percent of new residents 
in a fifty-two county area during the 1990s were prisoners. Id. 
 69. RYAN S. KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A 
COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP 1 (2005), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/ 
publications/inc_iandc_complex.pdf. A concern that an increasing number of prisoners have 
been wrongfully or unjustly convicted and sentenced has accompanied this era of mass 
incarceration. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring 
Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 339 (2006). 
 70. See, e.g., infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 71. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 1.015(e) (West 2010); see also Julian Aguilar, Lawmakers 
Urge a Change in How Inmates are Counted, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Sept. 9, 2010), http:// 
www.texastribune.org/texas-counties-and-demographics/census/lawmakers-urge-a-change-in-how-
inmates-are-counted/ (describing the tension between Texas state law and the practice of 
counting prisoners as residents of the prison). 
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. . . institution unless such residence has been abandoned and new 
legal residence established.‖72 Arizona includes such a provision in 
its constitution.
73
 
Many opponents of counting prisoners as residents of their prison 
locations point out that, unlike college students and other groups 
covered by the usual-residence rule, prisoners have not chosen to live 
in their temporary location.
74
 Prisoners typically maintain an intent to 
return to the communities from which they were removed.
75
 Further, 
legislators often acknowledge that they do not treat the prisoners in 
their districts as constituents.
76
 The amount of time prisoners spend 
locked up is relatively brief.
77
 
D. Effect of Census Count on Redistricting 
The policy of counting prisoners as residents of the communities 
in which they are imprisoned has profound consequences. It results in 
population data about communities—both the prison communities 
 
 72. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 11-205 (2010). 
 73. ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (―For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to 
have gained or lost a residence by reason of being present or absent . . . while confined in any 
public jail or prison.‖). 
 74. PETER WAGNER ET AL., PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, WHY THE CENSUS CAN AND 
MUST START COLLECTING THE HOME ADDRESSES OF INCARCERATED PEOPLE 3 (2006), 
available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/homeaddresses/CollectingHomeAddresses.pdf; see 
also PATRICIA ALLARD ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: 
WHY THE CENSUS BUREAU SHOULD CHANGE THE WAY IT COUNTS PRISONERS 3 (2004), 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/c81dbb2c77b9439d8f_ylm6bxclw.pdf (―[C]orrections 
officials assign prisoners to . . . institutions . . . without regard for the individual‘s interest or 
needs . . . . Without any control over their location or their right to stay in a location, prisoners 
cannot be said to ‗reside‘ in their place of incarceration.‖). 
 75. See WAGNER ET AL., supra note 74, at 4 (―When a prisoner‘s sentence is completed, 
he or she will not be permitted to stay in the facility and will most likely return to the 
community that he or she was removed from when the incarceration began‖); see also ALLARD 
ET AL., supra note 74, at 4 (―Prisoners overwhelmingly return to where they lived prior to their 
incarceration.‖). 
 76. See, e.g., Jonathan Tilove, Minority Prison Inmates Skew Local Populations as States 
Redistrict, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 12, 2002), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/news/ 
newhousenews031202.html (quoting two state legislators of rural counties with large prison 
populations as stating that they ―do get letters from inmates with a variety of complaints, but 
. . . their real attention is directed toward corrections workers, with whom both have forged 
strong relationships‖). 
 77. See PANEL ON RESIDENCE RULES IN THE DECENNIAL CENSUS, supra note 14, at 93 
(noting that the median time behind bars for prisoners released in 2002 was seventeen months). 
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and the communities of origin—that, while relied on by policy 
makers, does not accurately reflect the needs of those communities.
78
 
Depending on the specific state formula for distribution of tax 
revenue, counties with prisons can get bumps in education funding,
79
 
sales tax revenue,
80
 and targeted funding for communities with 
sizable low-income populations.
81
 ―The imagination,‖ the Census 
Bureau itself has noted, ―is the only limit upon the use of the statistics 
that come out of the census.‖82 
Most directly, release of the results of the decennial census 
triggers the legislative redistricting process in every state. At the 
Congressional level, shifts in population size lead to states gaining or 
losing seats in Congress every ten years.
83
 Because of the sheer size 
of Congressional districts—about 647,000 people per district in 
2000
84—adding or subtracting a few thousand prisoners would be 
unlikely to affect Congressional lines.
85
 But apportionment of state 
legislative districts and local political bodies is another story. States 
rely heavily on the results of the decennial census to apportion their 
state legislative seats.
86
 The impact of prison populations on how 
 
 78. See WAGNER ET AL., supra note 74, at 3 (―The result of counting large external 
populations of prisoners as local residents leads to misleading conclusions about the size and 
growth of communities . . . . Counties that see prisons close their doors report that their Census 
populations declined when in fact their actual population did not. Conversely, population 
growth reported by some counties is due to the importation of prisoners to a new correctional 
institution.‖). 
 79. Lotke & Wagner, supra note 64, at 601. 
 80. WAGNER ET AL., supra note 74, at 8. 
 81. Lotke & Wagner, supra note 64, at 604–05. 
 82. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT: STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: 
YOUR GUIDE TO CENSUS 2010 REDISTRICTING DATA FROM THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), 
available at http://www.census.gov/rdo/pdf/StrengthInNumbers2010.pdf. 
 83. See, e.g., Jay Root, Texas Will See Dramatic Gains in US House Seats, YAHOO! NEWS 
(Dec. 3, 2010), http://news.yahoo.com/texas-see-dramatic-gain-us-house-seats.html (noting that 
Texas was expected to gain an additional three or four seats in Congress when the 2010 Census 
figures were released). 
 84. Congressional Apportionment, NATIONALATLAS.GOV, http://www.nationalatlas.gov/ 
articles/boundaries/a_conApport.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
 85. See Lotke & Wagner, supra note 64, at 594. 
 86. See S. REP. NO. 94-539, at 2 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2100, 2101–02. 
Congress formalized the process by which states provided to the Census Bureau their needs for 
legislative districts so that the Census reports could be used by states for the purposes of 
redistricting and apportionment. Id. The U.S. Constitution does not require state legislatures to 
use the census for the purposes of apportionment or districting. See Groves, supra note 20 
(describing the Census Bureau as ―not involved‖ in redistricting). Instead, reliance on the 
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state legislative seats are divvied up can be stark.
87
 One reporter 
called the inclusion of a prison in a state legislative district ―a coveted 
prize.‖88 In upstate New York, for example, the Prison Policy 
Initiative identified seven rural state-senate districts that likely would 
not be large enough to qualify as individual districts without their 
prison populations.
89
 More than 10 percent of the populations in two 
state legislative districts in Texas comprises prisoners.
90
 At the local 
level, officials have instituted a patchwork of policies to address the 
question of whether to count prison populations for drawing district 
boundaries.
91
 In Florida‘s Calhoun County, there is a county 
commissioner who represents a district in which 48 percent of the 
residents are incarcerated.
92
 Four other Florida counties have 
commission seats representing prison populations that account for 
more than 18 percent of the district.
93
 But in at least five other 
counties in Florida, officials excluded prisoners from their population 
tallies for purposes of drawing district boundaries for county 
commission seats.
94
 At least 100 counties across the country have 
made the independent decision to exclude prisoners from their 
populations for purposes of redistricting.
95
 Critics such as the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund have said that counting 
 
Census was spurred in part by Baker v. Carr and its progeny, in which the Supreme Court 
heightened the burden on state legislatures to ensure that there is roughly equal representation 
in state legislative districts. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 186, 186 (1962); see also supra notes 
36–39 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Lotke & Wagner, supra note 64, at 594 (noting that because the median size of a 
state House district is under 40,000, the presence or absence of a few thousand prisoners could, 
and does, affect where district lines are drawn). 
 88. Tilove, supra note 76 (reporting on the effect of prison populations on the redistricting 
process that followed the 2000 census and commenting that ―[p]risons can be a coveted prize in 
this process, swelling a district‘s population with constituents who cannot vote‖). 
 89. Peter Wagner, Importing Constituents: Prisoners and Political Clout in New York, 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Apr. 22, 2002), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/importing/importing 
.shtml. 
 90. Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering after the 2010 Census: Texas, PRISONERS OF 
THE CENSUS (March 2010), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states/TX.html. 
 91. See Local Governments that Exclude Prison Populations, PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS, 
http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/local/ (last updated Sept. 20, 2011). 
 92. Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering after the 2010 Census: Florida, PRISONERS OF 
THE CENSUS (Mar. 2010), http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states/FL.html. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Local Governments that Exclude Prison Populations, supra note 91. 
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prisoners toward a community‘s population for redistricting purposes 
―artificially inflates the population count—and thus, the political 
influence—of the districts where prisons and jails are located.‖96 The 
increase in population attributable to prisoners in rural prison towns 
comes at the expense of the urban communities from which prisoners 
typically hail, a dynamic that has led critics to call the effect prison-
based gerrymandering.
97
  
E. Impact of Three-Fifths Compromise on Representation  
As a result of the three-fifths compromise brokered during the 
Constitutional Convention, slave states won the right to count three-
fifths of their slave populations for purposes of legislative 
apportionment.
98
 They reaped the benefits in political power. In 1793, 
Southern states had forty-seven seats in Congress compared to fifty-
eight for the North.
99
 Had the slaves not counted, then the allotment 
would have been thirty-three seats for the South compared to fifty-
seven seats for the North.
100
 
The opportunity to count slaves for legislative apportionment—
even at three-fifths their total population—was, in the words of one 
scholar, ―a political gift that kept giving.‖101 Unburdened at the time 
by the ―one-person, one-vote‖ principle, slave-holding states drew 
political-district maps that maximized the political potency of their 
slave-holding regions.
102
 For example, in Virginia ―fifteen Virginia 
districts with the highest percentage of slaves averaged only 25,000 
 
 96. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, CAPTIVE CONSTITUENTS: PRISON-BASED 
GERRYMANDERING & THE DISTORTION OF OUR DEMOCRACY (2010), available at http:// 
naacpldf.org/files/publications/captive_constituents.pdf. 
 97. The moniker was assigned because of the increased political influence attained by 
communities with prison populations. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, supra note 96; 
see also PRISONERS OF THE CENSUS, http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org (last visited Sept. 23, 
2010). 
 98. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. Slave states, most adamantly South 
Carolina, advocated for an allowance of ―equal representation‖ for slaves and free persons. 
ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 199.  
 99. AMAR, supra note 4, at 94. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 97. 
 102. Id. 
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free folk compared to an average 37,000 in the other districts, all in 
the west.‖103 
F. State Legislative Changes 
Even though the Census Bureau declined entreaties to change its 
method of counting prisoners, it did, for the first time, gave states 
specific population data necessary to do so on their own. The Census 
Bureau provided early counts of prison populations and other group 
quarters to states to use in crafting their redistricting plans.
104
 
Advocates for changing how prisoners are counted noted that the 
change gave states the tools, for the first time, to apply their own 
standards.
105
 And for the redistricting process following the release of 
the 2010 Census, at least three states—Maryland, New York, and 
Delaware—are departing from the Census Bureau‘s standard for 
counting prisoners.
106
 
Maryland Governor Martin O‘Malley signed into law the ―No 
Representation Without Population Act‖ in April of 2010.107 The law 
made Maryland the first state to count prisoners anywhere other than 
their incarceration address for redistricting.
108
 The law requires that 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Groves, supra note 20 (explaining that the purpose of releasing the early data on 
group quarters was to give states the options to either ―leave the prisoners counted where the 
prisons are, delete them from the redistricting formulas, or assign them to some other locale‖).  
 105. See Sam Roberts, New Option for the States on Inmates in the Census, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2010, at A18. The paper quoted one advocate‘s lukewarm praise of the move: 
―This removes a technical problem,‖ said Peter Wagner, executive director of the 
Prison Policy Initiative, an advocacy group that favors alternatives to prison sentences 
and urges that inmates be counted in their hometowns. ―The census is going to say 
where the prisons are and how many people are in them, which will enable states the 
practical choice of counting them in the wrong place or not counting them at all.‖ 
Id. The change fell short of advocates‘ request that the Census Bureau provide home address 
information for prisoners but did give states enough data to exclude prisoners for the counts of 
their prison communities and thus ―avoid prison-based gerrymandering.‖ Id. 
 106. See infra notes 107, 117–19, 123. 
 107. Press Release, Office of Governor Martin O‘Malley, Bills to be Signed by the 
Governor on April 13, 2010, at 20 (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www.governor.maryland. 
gov/documents/100413billssigned.pdf. 
 108. Carol Morello, Maryland to Count Prisoners in Home Towns; Shift in Census 
Redistricting Baltimore Stands to Gain Amid Outcry, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2010, at B5. 
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the population counts used for creating congressional districts,
109
 
state legislative districts,
110
 and county and municipal legislative 
districts
111
 count prisoners in state and federal correctional facilities 
―at their last known residence before incarceration if the individuals 
were residents of the State.‖112 Out-of-state prisoners are excluded 
from the count altogether.
113
 Among critics of the change were rural 
lawmakers who called it a ―power-grab‖ by urban lawmakers from 
places such as Baltimore.
114
 But civil-rights leaders praised the 
change.
115
 
New York Governor David Paterson signed a bill into law on 
August 11, 2010, that requires legislative line-drawers to count 
prisoners as residents of their preincarceration addresses.
116
 The law, 
which is only effective as long as the Census Bureau continues to 
count prisoners as residents of their prisons, requires the Corrections 
Department to report to the legislature following each census the 
―residential address of [each prisoner] prior to incarceration (if 
any).‖117 The law further requires a ―legislative taskforce‖ to assign 
each prisoner to a census block based on their preincarceration 
 
 109. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-701 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2009). 
 110. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV‘T § 2-2A-01 (LexisNexis 2009). 
 111. MD. CODE ANN., § 1-111 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2009). 
 112. ELEC. LAW § 8-701(a)(2).  
 113. Id. § 8-701(a)(1)(II). 
 114. Morello, supra note 108, at B5.  
 115. See id. 
 116. A.B. 9710, 233rd Leg., 2010 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010); see also Editorial, An End to 
Prison Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2010, at A22. 
 117. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 71(8)(a) (McKinney 2010). The statute lays out specific 
requirements for the state corrections department to follow in order to provide usable address 
information:  
 In each year in which the federal decennial census is taken but in which the United 
States bureau of the census does not implement a policy of reporting incarcerated 
persons at each such person‘s residential address prior to incarceration, the department 
of correctional services shall by September first of that same year deliver to the 
legislative task force on demographic research and reapportionment the following 
information for each incarcerated person subject to the jurisdiction of the department 
and located in this state on the date for which the decennial census reports population: 
(i) A unique identifier, not including the name, for each such person; (ii) The street 
address of the correctional facility in which such person was incarcerated at the time of 
such report; (iii) The residential address of such person prior to incarceration (if any); 
and (iv) Any additional information as the task force may specify pursuant to law. 
Id. 
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address, make the information available to municipalities for local 
redistricting purposes, and to use the data for redistricting of state 
legislative seats.
118
 The sponsor of the bill cited his belief that relying 
on census data led to ―dilution of minority voting strength in 
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,‖ that it ―violate[d] 
the ‗one person, one vote‘ principle,‖ and that it violated the state 
constitutional provision asserting that a prisoner does not become a 
resident of his prison.
119
 The New York Times editorial board 
heralded the end of ―the cynical practice of counting prison inmates 
as ‗residents,‘ to pad the size of legislative districts.‖120 The paper 
said that the law ―deserves to be emulated all across the country.‖121 
Rural lawmakers, who stood to see the size and influence of their 
districts diminished because of the new law, sued to block its 
enforcement.
122
 Less than a month after Paterson signed New York‘s 
law, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed legislation that was 
substantially similar to Maryland‘s.123 
 
 118. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m(13)(b) (McKinney 2010). The statute requires: 
 [T]he task force shall determine the census block corresponding to the street address 
of each such person‘s residential address prior to incarceration (if any), and the census 
block corresponding to the street address of the correctional facility in which such 
person was held subject to the jurisdiction of such department . . . . [T]he task force 
shall use such data to develop a database in which all incarcerated persons shall be, 
where possible, allocated for redistricting purposes, such that each geographic unit 
reflects incarcerated populations at their respective residential addresses prior to 
incarceration rather than at the addresses of such correctional facilities. The task force 
shall develop and maintain such amended population data set and shall make such 
amended data set available to local governments, as defined in subdivision eight of 
section two of the municipal home rule law, and for the drawing of assembly and 
senate districts. The assembly and senate districts shall be drawn using such amended 
population data set. The assembly and senate districts shall be drawn using such 
amended population data set. 
Id. 
 119. N.Y. Sponsors Memorandum, Assemb. 223-9380, 2010 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010). The 
state constitutional provision states that ―no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a 
residence . . . while confined in any public prison.‖ N.Y. CONST. art. 2, § 4. 
 120. Editorial, supra note 116. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Complaint, Little v. N.Y. Leg. Task Force, No. 2310/2011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed April 
4, 2011), available at http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/little/complaint.pdf. 
 123. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 804A (2006 & Supp. 2010). 
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II. ANALYSIS & PROPOSAL 
By maintaining an internally inconsistent set of practices for 
counting group quarters, the Census Bureau has ensured that 
prisoners remain isolated, not just physically, but statistically, from 
their home communities; and this has substantial implications for 
representative democracy. Despite calls from activists, academics, 
policy makers, and lawmakers to change the manner of counting 
prisoners, the Bureau continues to defend its policy. Among those 
calling for change are the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
124
 the 
American Civil Liberties Union,
125
 Demos,
126
 the National Black 
Caucus of State Legislators,
127
 the Brennan Center for Justice,
128
 the 
Census Bureau‘s African American Advisory Committee,129 and the 
Prison Policy Initiative.
130
 
 
 124. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, supra note 96. The organization has stated 
that a permanent solution to prison-based gerrymandering requires Census action: 
Advocates are engaged in a long-term campaign to encourage the Census Bureau to 
implement a permanent solution, in which the decennial census would identify the 
home communities of incarcerated persons and count them appropriately. An accurate 
population count during the next Census can solve the problem of prison-based 
gerrymandering once and for all. 
Id. 
 125. Michael Cummings, Imprisoned by the Census, BLOG OF RIGHTS, ACLU.ORG (Apr. 2, 
2010, 4:45 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights-racial-justice/imprisoned-census. 
 126. A Dilution of Democracy: Prison-Based Gerrymandering, DEMOS (2010), http://www 
.demos.org/pubs/prison_gerrymand_factsheet.pdf (―The optimal solution is for the Census 
Bureau to change its outdated practice and begin counting incarcerated persons as residents of 
the community where they resided prior to incarceration, and to which they overwhelmingly 
return upon their release.‖). 
 127. THE NAT‘L BLACK CAUCUS OF STATE LEGISLATORS, SEEING BEYOND—A NEW 
DECADE DEFINING OUR NEW LEGACY, 2011 RATIFIED POLICY RESOLUTIONS 41 (2010), 
available at http://www.nbcsl.org/2011_Resolutions.pdf (calling on the Census Bureau to count 
prisoners at their preincarceration addresses in all future censuses).  
 128. ALLARD ET AL., supra note 74, at 1 (―Counting prisoners in their homes of record is 
the most fair and accurate procedure, and is the best vehicle to ensure the Bureau meets its 
strategic goals.‖).  
 129. Recommendations of the Census Advisory Committee, supra note 23; see also supra 
text accompanying note 23. 
 130. See WAGNER ET AL., supra note 74. 
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A. Usual-Residence Rule is Internally Inconsistent 
While the Census Bureau suggests that the usual-residence 
principle is a straightforward matter of counting people where they 
live and sleep most of the time,
131
 the principle that makes this 
method logical for other group quarters and transient populations 
does not apply to prisoners. Even under the Census Bureau‘s 
residence rules, the agency realizes that where a person may have 
stronger ties to another place and the intent to return there, it makes 
logical sense to count the person as a resident of his or her permanent 
home.
132
 It does so for people who are traveling on business or 
pleasure on Census Day, for boarders, for residents of mental health 
treatment facilities, and for people in workers‘ group living 
quarters.
133
 In each case, the person filling out his census form 
weighs his personal situation and identifies the address at which he 
will be counted for the census.
134
  
The starkest illustration of the Census Bureau making allowances 
for nonprison populations but not for prison populations is seen in its 
treatment of the way it treats juveniles. The Census Bureau counts 
juveniles away from home at boarding school as residents of the 
parental home but counts juveniles in juvenile detention centers as 
residents of the detention centers.
135
 One may ask whether this 
distinction speaks to Census Bureau views about the level of 
involvement of parents in the lives of juveniles away at boarding 
school compared to the involvement of parents whose children are 
locked in juvenile detention centers. While both groups live and sleep 
outside the home for an extended period of time, the guidelines 
acknowledge the enduring ties to home for the boarding-school 
students but not for the incarcerated juveniles.
136
 As it relates to 
where they should be counted, the primary difference is that the 
 
 131. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 132. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
 133. Residence Rule, supra note 13. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See PANEL ON RESIDENCE RULES IN THE DECENNIAL CENSUS, supra note 14, at 93, 
for arguments that the ―enduring ties‖ test should be applied to counting prisoners at their 
permanent homes.  
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boarding-school students are away from home voluntarily, whereas 
juveniles in juvenile detention centers are involuntarily confined. 
The issue of voluntariness has frequently been cited in critiques of 
the Census Bureau‘s prisoner residence rules.137 It is unclear why 
people who voluntarily leave home would nevertheless be counted as 
residents of the home while people who would remain home but for 
their incarceration are counted as residents of a place they have not 
chosen.
138
 
B. Objections to Feasibility of Change are Addressable 
In the Census Bureau‘s 2006 response to Congress‘s admonition 
to consider the feasibility of counting prisoners at their ―permanent 
home of record,‖139 the Bureau noted that there was no generally 
accepted definition of ―permanent home of record,‖ which was the 
term that Congress used in making its request.
140
 The Census Bureau 
also pointed to the unreliability of prison address records and the high 
cost of personally interviewing every prisoner.
141
 The Prison Policy 
Initiative rebutted those arguments.
142
 As to the unreliability of 
prisoner address records, the Prison Policy Initiative noted that 
distributing census forms directly to prisoners would be safe and 
accurate and that most states‘ prison records include home addresses 
reflecting prisoners‘ homes at the time of incarceration.143 For those 
states that do not have computerized records of prisoners‘ 
preincarceration addresses, some cost would be associated with 
 
 137. E.g., WAGNER ET AL., supra note 74, at 3. The Prison Policy Initiative noted that 
―unlike other ‗group quarters‘ populations, prisoners do not choose to be at the facility and are 
not considered part of the surrounding community.‖ Id. 
 138. See ALLARD ET AL., supra note 74, at 3 (noting that prison assignments are made 
―without regard for the individuals‘ interests or needs‖ and concluding that ―without any control 
over their location or their right to stay in a location, prisoners cannot be said to ‗reside‘ in their 
place of incarceration‖). 
 139. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, supra note 25. 
 140. Id. at 10. 
 141. Id. The Census Bureau noted that, as of 1998, 25 percent of states either did not record 
information on the preincarceration addresses of prisoners or only had such information in 
paper form. CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, supra note 25, at 7; see also supra notes 26–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 142. WAGNER ET AL., supra note 74. 
 143. Id. at 15–25.  
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compiling the data, but one state that has analyzed the cost found that 
it would not be substantial.
144
 It is true that some of these addresses 
may represent homes that have been sold or to which a prisoner is 
otherwise unlikely to return to upon completion of his sentence.
145
 
However, to the extent that this is the case, it would make the census 
a mildly lagging indicator of prisoners‘ addresses, but would still 
paint a more realistic picture than would counting prisoners as 
residents of the prisons.  
C. Census Policy is Problematic for State Policy 
The Census Bureau‘s policy of counting prisoners as residents of 
their prisons forces many states to choose between following the 
Census Bureau or following their own laws.
146
 Many states have 
constitutional and statutory provisions declaring that prisoners 
maintain their residency at their preincarceration addresses.
147
 One 
sponsor of the legislation that changed New York‘s system for 
counting prisoners in redistricting identified this problem as the 
primary justification for change.
148
 However, particularly in light of 
the Census Bureau providing early data to states on prison 
populations,
149
 there is a third alternative. 
D. “One Person, One Vote” Compels States to Change 
States can, and under the Constitution should, count prisoners as 
residents of their preincarceration addresses for redistricting purposes 
despite the Census Bureau‘s policy. In states that continue to count 
prisoners as residents of their prisons for legislative redistricting 
purposes, the weight of a citizen‘s vote in the state depends on where 
 
 144. Maryland estimated the cost to develop a database including the name and last known 
address of prisoners in state prisons to be $50,000. DEP‘T OF LEG. SERV., MD. GEN. ASSEMB., 
FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, HB 496, 2010 Sess. (2010). 
 145. See CENSUS BUREAU REPORT, supra note 25, at 11 (―[S]ome addresses could be out-
dated by several years.‖).  
 146. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra note 119 (―This bill seeks to . . . bring current census practices in New York 
State back in line with the State Constitution.‖).  
 149. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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he or she lives.
150
 A citizen who has the good political fortune of 
living in the same legislative district as a prison has greater political 
representation than a citizen who lives in a community that is an 
exporter of prisoners.
151
 To believe otherwise would require one to 
accept that a prisoner is a constituent of the politician who represents 
his prison community. Candidly, many politicians admit that they do 
not view the prisoners inside the walls of their districts‘ prisons as 
constituents.
152
 Further, considering the political realities of the rural 
districts that tend to house large prisons, some see it as absurd to 
view prisoners as the rural politicians‘ constituents.153 Further, the 
disenfranchisement of these prisoners in all but two states also 
counsels against viewing them as constituents of their prison 
districts.
154
 And the fact that prisoners stay locked up for a relatively 
short period of time
155
 also points to the inappropriateness of 
counting them as prison residents for a redistricting scheme that will 
last, in most cases, until the next census, ten years later.
156
 
Since the only real constituents of these prison districts are the 
voting residents who live outside the prison walls, it is their political 
power that must be weighed against others in the state for the ―one 
person, one vote‖ analysis. Prison-district legislators answer to fewer 
real constituents than legislators outside of prison districts and thus 
give their constituents relatively more say in state business.
157
 
 
 150. See supra notes 83–95 and accompanying text (demonstrating areas where it takes 
fewer constituents to elect a representative in prison districts than in nonprison districts). 
 151. Id. 
 152. E.g., Tilove, supra note 76. 
 153. See, e.g., Drake Bennett, Head Count: The Census Counts Prisoners as Residents of 
the Towns Where They’re Incarcerated. One Crusading Lawyer from Northampton Thinks This 
Little Clerical Matter is a Big Problem for American Democracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 26, 
2004, at D1 (―[P]risoners‘ interests, [Peter Wagner] argues, tend to be especially divorced from 
those of their legislators. The weight of the prison population strengthens the very districts and 
legislators with the most stake in tough-on-crime policies that create and fill more prisons 
. . . .‖). 
 154. See supra notes 49–55 and accompanying text. In the two states that allow prisoners 
to vote, they are required to vote absentee at their preincarceration addresses, making the 
suggestion that they would be constituents of their prison districts even more tenuous. See 
supra note 50. 
 155. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 157. See, e.g., supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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E. The Voting Rights Act Compels Change 
The dilutive effect of prison-based gerrymandering on the 
political influence of the largely urban, majority-minority 
communities from which a disproportionate number of prisoners hail, 
invokes the protections of the Voting Rights Act.
158
 Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act prohibits legislative apportionment schemes that 
dilute the voting power of minority communities.
159
 Because prisons 
are disproportionately located in rural, mostly white communities,
160
 
and prisoners are disproportionately minority residents of urban 
areas,
161
 counting prisoners as residents of their prison towns dilutes 
the voting strength of minority communities. Whether a court would 
find a particular state‘s redistricting scheme violative of the Voting 
Rights Act on this basis would be a highly fact-intensive 
determination subject to scrutiny of legislative intent, minority voting 
patterns, discriminatory effect, and other factors beyond the scope of 
this Note.
162
 Nevertheless, the indisputable fact of minority vote 
dilution—a circumstance section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was 
created to prevent—should compel states to pause before 
perpetuating legislative redistricting schemes that inflate the 
populations of prison towns at the expense of urban areas. 
A state‘s biggest obstacle to change may be the political self-
interest of rural legislators. The areas likeliest to gain political 
advantage as a result of ending prison-based gerrymandering are 
urban communities—areas in which Democrats tend to have an 
advantage.
163
 The areas with the most to lose are rural communities, 
which Republicans are more likely to represent.
164
 With Republicans 
 
 158. See Rosanna M. Taormina, Comment, Defying One-Person, One-Vote: Prisoners and 
the “Usual Residence” Principle, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434 (2004) (arguing that the 
application of the usual-residence rule to prisoners ―effectively runs afoul of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965‖). 
 159. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 160. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 162. See generally Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 163. See, e.g., Editorial, Prison-Based Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2006, at A12 
(“Prison-based gerrymandering has helped Republicans in the northern part of New York 
maintain a perennial majority in the State Senate and exercise an outsized influence in state 
affairs.‖). 
 164. Id. 
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controlling a majority of state legislatures and taking over from 
Democrats in one or both chambers in fifteen states in the 2010 
elections,
165
 political considerations could lead to resistance to 
changing the method of how prisoners are counted.
166
 Thus, it will be 
important for legislators to set aside partisan considerations on the 
issue of prison-based gerrymandering. Advocates suggest that at least 
one of the states to have successfully tackled the issue did so.
167
 
F. Comparisons to Three-Fifths Clause are Inescapable 
Critics have frequently compared the practice of propping up the 
populations of rural districts with disenfranchised prisoners to the 
three-fifths clause of the Constitution,
168
 through which slave states 
increased their political clout in Washington by counting three-fifths 
of their slaves as part of their populations.
169
 When the debates that 
gave rise to the three-fifths clause, the characteristics of the slave 
population, and the effect of the compromise on legislative 
apportionment are considered, it becomes clear that the comparison is 
more than a rhetorical device. Historian Donald L. Robinson said one 
momentous element of the three-fifths clause was the notion that a 
person who lived among slaves had greater political representation 
 
 165. Map of Post 2010 Election Partisan Composition of State Legislatures, NAT‘L CONF. 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/tabid/21253/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 
2011). 
 166. See supra notes 42–47 and accompanying text for a discussion of influence of politics 
on redistricting. 
 167. See PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, WHY OUR OPPONENTS SHOULD SUPPORT ENDING 
PRISON-BASED GERRYMANDERING IN NEW YORK STATE, http://www.prisonersofthecensus 
.org/factsheets/ny/opponents.pdf (last modified May 20, 2010) (noting Maryland‘s ―No 
Representation Without Population Act‖ passed with bipartisan support, including the support 
of rural lawmakers with prisons in their districts). But see supra note 122 and accompanying 
text for an example of a state where apparent partisan considerations have led to legal 
challenge. 
 168. ―Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several states . . . according to 
their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free 
persons . . . three fifths of all other persons.‖ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 169. See, e.g., NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, supra note 96, at 2 (calling the use 
of the ―captive‖ prison population for redistricting purposes ―all too reminiscent‖ of the three-
fifths compromise); Editorial, Phantom Constituents in the Census, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, 
at A16 (saying use of ―phantom constituents‖ by rural legislators bears an ―unfortunate 
resemblance to early America under slavery‖). 
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than a person who did not.
170
 Likewise, a citizen who has the political 
fortune to live near a prison has greater political representation than a 
person who does not. In fact, it is striking that the three-fifths clause 
has been characterized as ―a political gift‖171 and the inclusion of 
prisons in a political district as ―a coveted prize.‖172 Prisoners are 
counted for redistricting purposes despite the fact that they cannot 
vote on the politicians who represent their districts. Slaves were 
counted for redistricting purposes even though they, too, were denied 
the franchise. By definition, slaves remained in the custody of their 
owners involuntarily, just as prisoners are involuntarily incarcerated. 
Historically, under the three-fifths clause, and currently by way of 
prison-based gerrymandering, the effect on representation is 
mathematically verifiable.
173
 The comparison is not perfect,
174
 but the 
parallels are such that prison-based gerrymandering can plausibly be 
viewed as a descendant of the three-fifths compromise in America‘s 
lineage of injustices. 
G. Changing State Laws 
Faced with a census that counts prisoners at their places of 
incarceration, the options that state legislatures have considered can 
be broken into three categories. First, states may rely on the data as it 
is provided, continuing to count prisoners where they are incarcerated 
and leaving it to local counties to decide how to deal with those 
populations for redistricting purposes.
175
 Second, states may simply 
exclude inmates from their tallies
176
 as a number of counties have 
 
 170. See ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 201. 
 171. AMAR, supra note 4, at 97.  
 172. Tilove, supra note 76. 
 173. See supra notes 86–94, 99–04 and accompanying text. 
 174. It must be noted that slaves, unlike prisoners, were wholly blameless in their captivity. 
However, when one considers the theories of wrongful convictions and mass incarceration 
proffered by commentators such as Bryan Stevenson, the force of this distinction loses its 
impact. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Tom Howe, Where Should Inmates be Counted for Redistricting?, INTERIM NEWS, 
Aug. 12, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/interim/int81-5.pdf. 
 176. Id. 
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done.
177
 Third, they may develop a process for counting prisoners as 
residents of their preincarceration and/or permanent homes.
178
 
The first option, which represents the default option adopted by 
most states, is unjust for the constitutional and practical reasons that 
this Note describes. The second option, which has been adopted by a 
number of counties,
179
 is preferable to the first, but addresses only 
half of the problem. It prevents the inflation of political power in 
rural districts directly attributable to counting their prison 
populations, but it does not correct the dilution of power in nonprison 
districts attributable to the exportation of their prisoners.
180
 
The third option—the one adopted by the states of New York, 
Delaware, and Maryland—is, while not perfect, the one that is most 
fair and administratively feasible. It is not perfect because it will 
inevitably count as residents of their former communities some 
prisoners who will never return.
181
 However, this concern presumes a 
level of perfection in the methods now relied upon—primarily 
dependence on Census Bureau figures—that does not square with 
reality. In fact, the Census Bureau director himself has acknowledged 
that because of the ever-changing nature of the U.S. population, 
―there is no single right answer of what the population on April 1, 
2010 was.‖182 The lack of precision that may inhere in counting 
prisoners at their preincarceration addresses pales in comparison to 
the absence of justice in counting disenfranchised prisoners as 
residents of communities that they did not choose, where they do not 
intend to stay, and in which they cannot participate as citizens. 
 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
 178. Howe, supra note 175. 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
 180. See DEMOS, supra note 126 (―This does not put the prisoners back into their rightful 
residential communities, but it eliminates the large and unjustifiable vote enhancement created 
by crediting their numbers to prison districts.‖). But cf. NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, 
supra note 96, at 8 (rejecting exclusion of prisoner populations altogether on the basis that 
―[e]verybody counts, whether they can vote or not. The issue is not whether prisoners should be 
counted, but where‖).  
 181. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 182. Robert M. Groves, Quality in a Census, Some Overview Thoughts, DIRECTOR‘S BLOG 
(Sept. 9, 2010, 8:16 AM), http://blogs.census.gov/directorsblog/2010/09/quality-in-a-census-
some-overview-thoughts.html (―[T]he ideal of ‗count every resident once, and only once, and in 
the right place‘ is the correct target. I also must admit that the US Census never has, and likely 
never will, achieve that goal.‖). 
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CONCLUSION 
Mass incarceration has exacerbated an injustice in how the U.S. 
Census Bureau counts prisoners. It is an injustice that harkens to a 
time when slave-holding states deprived slaves of all civil and human 
rights but fought to have them counted to protect those same states‘ 
political clout in the new Republic.
183
 But states have the tools at 
hand to ensure that America‘s commitment to ―one person, one vote‖ 
is not thrown away with the key as its citizens are locked up. Even as 
the Census Bureau continues to resist calls to stop counting prisoners 
as residents of their prison communities, states can follow the lead of 
Maryland, New York, and Delaware and begin to count prisoners as 
residents of their preincarceration addresses. 
 
 183. See supra notes 1–5, 84–87, 104–21 and accompanying text. 
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